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Toward Regulation That Fosters
Competition
Chairman Reed Hundt*
As the Communications Act of 1934 turns sixty, the communications
community is in the midst of a number of dramatic changes. Some of the
networks comprising the "information highway," such as the wireless
communications network, are developing at a rapid pace. Other communications networks are converging. For example, cable companies may soon
offer telephone service and wireline telephone companies may soon offer
cable service.
With development and convergence comes the opportunity for
competition throughout the communications industry. From my perspective
as Chairman of the Federal Communications Commission (FCC or
Commission), I consider no goal to be more important than fostering
competition within and between the communications networks. Although
the Act has served the country well, many of its key provisions date from
an era in which there was no competition in the communications industry
and no realistic prospect for its introduction.
The organizers of this special issue have asked us to address how the
law should be changed to respond to the challenges facing the communications industry. I favor the enactment of a statutory provision granting the
Commission broad authority to waive or adapt the other provisions of the
Act in order to promote competition. Analysis of the issues raised by four
recent cases shows the need for such a provision.
In Bell Atlantic Telephone Companies v. FCC, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit struck down the Commission's "physical
collocation" rule, which required the local exchange companies (LECs) to
set aside part of their central offices for use by competitive access providers
(CAPs).' The purpose of the rule was to promote competition in a portion

* Chairman, Federal Communications Commission.
1. Bell Atlantic Tel., 24 F.3d 1441 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
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of the local telecommunications market, which-unlike the long-distance
market-remains largely uncompetitive.
The CAPs offer a service that allows businesses to bypass part of the
local exchange system when making long-distance calls. In order to allow
the CAPs to connect their transmission facilities to their customers' lines
most efficiently, the Commission determined that it was necessary to allow
the CAPs to install equipment in the LECs' offices and to string their
cables into those offices.2
The Commission found the authority to order physical collocation in
Section 201(a) of the Act,3 which provides that the Commission may order
telephone companies "to establish physical connections with other
carriers."4 The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed. In its view, "[t]he
Commission's power to order 'physical connections,' undoubtedly of broad
scope, does not supply a clear warrant to grant third parties a license to
exclusive physical occupation of a section of the LECs' central offices."5
It is not my purpose here to quarrel with the court's construction of
Section 201(a), although I believe the court of appeals should have deferred
to the Commission's interpretation of the statute. The point I want to make
is that no one contended that the FCC's policy was not procompetitive or
that it was not desirable to introduce a measure of competition into this part
of the telecommunications field. What the court of appeals held was that
the relevant provision of the Act did not authorize the Commission to
introduce competition into that part of the market in the most efficient
manner possible.
The Commission is committed to introducing competition into the
local exchange market and announced the adoption of a "virtual collocation" policy forty-five days after the D.C. Circuit handed down its
decision. 6 However, it should not have been necessary for the Commission
to formulate a fall-back position. The Act ought to provide, in terms that
no court will dispute, that the Commission has broad authority to take the,
steps necessary to introduce competition throughout the communications
industry in the most effective manner possible.
That lesson may also be drawn from the Supreme Court's recent
decision in the "permissive detariffing" case, MCI Telecommunications

2. Id. at 1444.
3. 47 U.S.C. § 201(a) (1988).
4. Bell Atlantic Tel., 24 F.3d at 1444-45.
5. Id. at 1446.
6. Expanded Interconnection with Local Tel. Co. Facilities, Memorandum Opinion and
Order, in CC Dkt. No. 91-141, FCC 94-190 (July 14, 1994).

Number 2]

REGULATION THAT FOSTERS COMPETITION

267

Corp. v. AT&T.7 The provision of the Act requiring telephone companies
to file tariffs listing their rates' remains on the statute books unchanged
despite the introduction of competition into the long-distance market in the
1970s. The tariff requirement was enacted to help the Commission police
AT&T's predecessor, the Bell System, which had a monopoly in 1934, by
providing evidence showing whether the Bell System was charging
unreasonable or unduly discriminatory rates. However, by 1979 the
Commission became concerned that the tariffing requirement was having
the perverse effect of assisting AT&T in resisting competition. The
Commission initiated rulemaking proceedings and subsequently determined
that the tariffing requirement induced noncompetitive pricing.
Tariffs had that effect because they made public any discounts that
AT&T's new competitors were offering, which allowed AT&T to match
those discounts immediately and, in turn, discouraged the new long-distance
companies from offering discounts in the first place. In addition, the
cumbersome regulatory apparatus implementing the tariffing requirement
allowed AT&T to delay price cuts by others and to impose substantial legal
costs on competitors attempting to offer discounts. 9
The Commission responded by providing that long-distance companies
lacking market power-i.e., all but AT&T-were not required to file tariffs.
The Commission based its decision on a provision of the Act which
authorizes the Commission to "modify any requirement" of Section 203 of
the Act.' Once again, no one argued that this was bad policy. AT&T
complained, but only because it also wanted to be relieved from filing
tariffs on the ground that the long-distance market was sufficiently
competitive that it could no longer discriminate unreasonably. But when the
Commission decided that AT&T should not be relieved from the tarifffiling requirement because it still controlled 60 percent of the long-distance
market, AT&T sued, contending that the Commission had exceeded its
authority. The Supreme Court ultimately agreed with AT&T, holding that
the elimination of the tariff-filing requirement "for forty percent of a major
sector of the industry is much too extensive to be considered a 'modifica1
tion."' '

7. MCI Telecomm. Corp., 114 S. Ct. 2223 (1994).
8. 47 U.S.C. § 203(a) (Supp. IV 1992).
9. In re Policy and Rules Conceming Rates for Competitive Common Carrier Servs.
and Facils. Authorizations Therefor, FurtherNotice of ProposedRulemaking, 84 F.C.C.2d
445, paras. 24-26 (1981).

10. 47 U.S.C. § 203(b)(2) (Supp. IV 1992).
11. MCI Telecomm. Corp., 114 S. Ct. at 2232.
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A properly deferential Court would not have reached that result. One
commonly used dictionary defines "modify" to mean, among other things,
"to make a basic or important change in," which plainly encompasses
relieving some telephone companies of the tariff-filing requirement. 2 In
addition, all dictionaries define "modify" to mean "change." Thus, the
statute is most reasonably interpreted as granting the Commission authority
to change "any requirement," including the tariff-filing requirement. Again,
my purpose here is not to quarrel with the Court's construction, but to
acknowledge that the Act did not provide the Commission with authority
to take a step that plainly was procompetitive in terms that were sufficiently clear to persuade the judicial branch.
The Act ought to provide explicitly and clearly that the Commission
may change any provision of the Act in order to promote competition.
There is no good reason to require compliance with provisions, like the
tariff-filing requirement, that made sense in another era, but ought to be
modified today.
The conclusion that a statute may outlive is useful life also is shown
by Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Co. v. United States.13 In that
case, the district court addressed the constitutionality of 47 U.S.C. § 533(b),
which was enacted in 1984 and codified a long-standing Commission rule
barring the LECs from providing cable service in areas where they have a
monopoly on local telephone service. The Commission's rule dated from
a time when cable television service reached only 9 percent of American
homes and had been maintained in part out of fear that the LECs would use
their telephone revenues to cross-subsidize
cable operations and cripple the
14
operators.
cable
newer
and
smaller
By 1992, however, enormous changes had occurred in both the cable
industry and the telecommunications industry. The cable industry had
grown considerably, reaching 60 percent of American homes. In addition,
in the wake of the 1983 judgment dispersing the Bell System, the LECs
were starting to enter lines of business beyond the traditional local
telephone business, and their entry into other fields was promoting riiore
vigorous competition in those fields.
More important changes were on the horizon, but were being stifled
by Section 533(b). In the "video dialtone" order, the Commission
anticipated that telephone companies could offer multi-channel video

12. Id. (citing WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY -1452'(1976)).
13. Chesapeake and Potomac TeL Co., 830 F. Supp. 909 (E.D. Va. 1993), ,af'd, No.
93-2340 (4th Cir. Nov. 21, 1994).
14. Id. at 912-13.
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transmission services. 5 Under the Commission's plan, the programmers
using the transmission service would compete with each other and the
existing cable monopolist (less than 1 percent of cable operators faced
head-to-head competition from another cable operator in 1992) under rules
designed to ensure that the LEC offered nondiscriminatory access to
programmers.
The Commission's plan plainly was superior to the status quo under
which consumers have only one choice. But telephone companies have
been reluctant to enter the video dialtone market if they may not provide
video programming, and legislation is needed to authorize telephone
companies to provide programming service on account of the enactment of
Section 533(b), even though both the cable and telephone industries have
changed dramatically since 1984. Moreover, a number of courts have
concluded that Section 533(b) unconstitutionally restricts telephone
companies' free speech rights, even though it may be that Section 533(b)
would have passed constitutional muster when it was enacted. 16 A
statutory provision giving the Commission broad and explicit authority to
waive and adapt any provision of the Act to foster competition would allow
the Commission to permit telephone companies to provide video programming, thus advancing consumers' interests and avoiding a difficult
constitutional issue.
The "must-carry" rules that were at issue in Turner Broadcasting
System, Inc. v. FCC,7 also illustrate the need for flexibility. Those rules
were enacted against the background of the pervasive cable monopoly that
currently exists and the resulting incentive to cable operators to treat
broadcasters unfairly. As the Supreme Court recognized, "[w]hen an
individual subscribes to cable, the physical connection between the
television set and the cable network gives the cable operator bottleneck, or
gatekeeper, control over most (if not all) of the television programming that
is channeled into the subscriber's home."'
Because cable operators compete with broadcasters for advertisers and
currently view broadcasters as their primary competitors, it is predictable
that cable operators with bottleneck control will drop marginal broadcast

15. In re Telephone Co.-Cable TV Cross-Ownership Rules, §§ 63.54-63.58, Second
Report and Order,Recommendation to Congress, and Second FurtherNotice ofProposed

Rulemaking, 7 FCC Rcd. 5781 (1992), aff'd, National Cable TV Ass'n v. FCC, 33 F.3d 66
(D.C: Cir. 1994).
16. Ameritech Corp. v. United States, No. 93-C-6642, slip. op. at 30 (N.D. II1.Oct. 27,
1994).
17. Turner Brdcst., 114 S. Ct. 2445, reh'g denied, 115 S. Ct. 30 (1994).

18. Id. at 2466.
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stations wherever possible. Congress attempted to ensure fair competition
between cable operators and broadcasters by enacting the must-carry rules,
which require cable operators to devote slightly more than one-third of their
channel capacity to broadcast stations."
However, the relationship between broadcasters and cable operators
will change dramatically if true head-to-head competition between cable
operators and telephone companies becomes a reality. If, for example, more
than one video programming provider was competing to serve the same
household, then it would be difficult for a cable operator to discriminate
against broadcasters. In fact, in such an environment video programming
providers might bid against each other for the rights to carry network
affiliates and other popular broadcasters. Perhaps special rules would be
needed to ensure that each video programming provider was able to carry
certain broadcast stations, since a video programming provider might not
provide realistic competition if it did not carry, for example, programming
provided by local network affiliates. At the same time, there would seem
to be little need for the must-carry rules.
The sort of statutory provision that I envision would grant the
Commission authority to ensure that the competition between the cable
operators was conducted fairly. For example, if such a step were warranted
to promote competition, the Commission might prohibit exclusive
agreements locking popular broadcasters into only one of the competing
video progamming providers. At the same time, the statutory provision I
envision would allow the Commission to retire the must-carry rules when
they no longer serve the purpose for which they were enacted.
CONCLUSION
The principles underlying my proposal provide a useful framework,
I believe, for judging the other proposals advanced in this special issue of
the Federal Communications Law Journal. Does the proposal foster
competition? Does it recognize that change is proceeding at such a rapid
pace that the basis for the proposal may change before the proposal is
implemented? In my view, proposals for legislative change must meet those
two tests in order to respond adequately to the challenges facing the
communications community on the sixtieth anniversary of the enactment of
the Communications Act of 1934.

19. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 534-35 (Supp. IV 1992).

